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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
1 r 
K\ I EKEN1 S" YR INGH A 'Is 1 , 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Casel >l ( » 20030316 C X 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AN D NA I UR E O F PROCEEDED G 
This is an appeal from convictions in two consolidated cases of two counts of 
distribution of or arranging to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine with .* p- "^  
conviction, both first degree felonies, 11 , > r i i , . t r v v.c Anii 
;oii1ai!ic(l in Stlriemliim ", ), 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(2002), pursuant to an order dated June 1 ^ ^'0? transferring this matter to this Court 
hoiii Lhc Utah Supreme (" mrl 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. Whether, under the "single criminal episode" doctrine, defendant may be 
prosecuted for his sale of drugs to a confidential informant after being convicted of 
possession of the drugs where the sales and the possessory acts occurred on the same day? 
Because defendant fails to comply with this Court's briefing requirements, review 
is not warranted, and no standard of review applies. 
B. In a related claim, is prosecution for distribution of cocaine barred under the 
"single criminal episode" doctrine where defendant had already been convicted of 
distribution of methamphetamine, and both sales occurred at different times on the same 
day? 
This issue of statutory construction is normally reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Keppler, 1999 UT App 89, U 4, 976 P.2d 99. However, if this Court reviews the issue, it 
should do so under the plain error doctrine because defendant failed to preserve the issue 
below. To obtain appellate relief through the doctrine of "plain error," an appellant must 
establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful." See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah App. 1996) 
(quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208), cert denied 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401 through 403 (2003), are 
reproduced in Addendum B. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
In November, 2001, defendant was charged with multiple offenses committed on 
November 7, 2001, which related to his possession of both methamphetamine and 
cocaine, as well as his conduct in passing a small tin containing bindles of each substance 
to another (R. 059: 49-54, 58-59; R. 063: 47-52, 56-57). He entered guilty pleas and was 
sentenced in May, 2002 (R. 059: 50, 58-59, 82-84; R. 063: 48, 56-57). 
On April 19, 2002, defendant was charged in the instant cases in separate 
informations with distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance—methamphetamine in one case, and cocaine in the other (R. 059: 4-8; R. 063: 
1-2). The charges arose from his sale of both substances to a confidential informant in 
two different transactions on November 7, 2001—the same day on which he committed 
the offenses above to which he pled guilty (R. 059: 11-12; R. 063: 1-2). The charges in 
each of these instant consolidated cases were subject to enhancement to first degree 
felonies because of the prior conviction (id). Following a joint preliminary hearing in 
!The record on appeal consists of one envelope and two pleading files: defendant 
did not request preparation of any transcripts. The pleading file in case number 
021800059, involving methamphetamine, will be cited herein as (R. 059:page number). 
Case number 021800063, involving cocaine, will be cited as (R. 063:page number). The 
case in which defendant entered a guilty plea, case number 011800120, will be referred to 
as case "120." 
Also, the pleading file in case number 021800059 contains a section where the 
page numbers have been mistakenly duplicated. The volume is paginated 1 through 137. 
The pages immediately thereafter begin again at 129 and continue sequentially through 
the end of the volume. Consequently, the volume has two sets of page numbers 129 
through 137. 
3 
these consolidated cases, defendant was bound over to district court in both cases (R. 059: 
44-45; R. 063:41-42). 
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges in both cases, arguing that the 
offenses charged in these two cases and those charged in November 2001 arose from a 
single criminal episode, that he should have been tried on all charges together, and that he 
could not be subjected to the trials in the instant cases because of his prior convictions 
(id). The district court judge denied the motion, finding that defendant's actions "were 
not part of a single criminal objective" (R. 059: 89; R. 063: 78). The judge found 
[T]he previous case involved defendant's criminal objective to possess the 
drugs and to conceal those drugs when approached by his parole officer, 
and by handing them to his cohort. Defendant was not involved in a sale of 
the drugs when arrested. His possession at that point was not incident to the 
accomplishment of the same criminal objective as the charge in the case sub 
judice, i.e., selling drugs for money.. . . 
While it is true that defendant is charged in both cases under [§] 58-
37-8, a case can be easily envisioned where a defendant is involved in two 
drug transactions, would be charged under the same statute, but would not 
constitute a single criminal episode. Rather, to be part of a single criminal 
episode, the statute requires the actions to be closely related in time and the 
defendant must possess a common criminal objective in both offenses. In 
the present case, the second prong is not satisfied as there was no single 
criminal objective, and where the prior offense was a completed and 
separate offense from the subsequent offense for which defendant was 
arrested and convicted. As the case is determined under the second prong, 
it is unnecessary to address the first prong or temporal requirement of the 
statute. 
(R. 059: 89; R. 063: 78) (attached in Addendum C). 
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The trial on the methamphetamine charge in case 059 occurred on November 19, 
while the trial on the cocaine charge in case 063 occurred on November 21 (R. 59:133-36; 
R. 063:128-31). Both juries convicted defendant as charged (R. 059: 129; R. 063: 126). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of five-years-to-life 
for each of the two charges, with the sentences to run concurrent to each other but 
consecutive to the sentence defendant was already serving (R. 059: 160-62; R. 063: 136-
40). Defendant timely appealed (R. 059: 169; R. 063: 143,145). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant sold methamphetamine and cocaine to Susie Springer on two separate 
occasions on November 7, 2002 (R. 059: 2-8, 49-50; R. 063: 1-7, 47-48). At the time, 
Susie was a confidential informant for the Uintah Basin Narcotics Strike Force ["Strike 
Force"] (R. 059; 49, 59; R. 063: 47, 57). 
The Strike Force used Susie to make numerous controlled substance buys from a 
number of people through December 2001 (R. 059: 59-60; R. 063: 57-58). On November 
7, Susie made arrangements with the Strike Force to purchase drugs from Ms. Carol 
Catoor in Neola, Utah (R. 059: 6, 49; R. 063: 4-5, 47).2 Defendant was at Catoor's home 
when Susie arrived, and he sold Susie methamphetamine (R. 059: 6, 50; R. 063: 47). 
When Susie met with the Strike Force agents following her purchase, she told them that 
2Carol is referred to as Carol "Catoor" and Carol "Keser" at various places in the 
record. The State uses only "Catoor" for consistency but intends to encompass all 
versions of the individual's name as may appear in the record. 
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defendant had more drugs to sell (R. 059: 6-7, 50). They had her conduct a second 
controlled buy from defendant later that same day, at which time she purchased cocaine, 
again at Ms. Catoor's home (R. 063: 4-6, 48). 
Later that same day, defendant's parole officer looked for and found defendant in 
his truck (R. 059: 68; R. 063: 66-67). When defendant saw him, defendant handed a 
small "Altoids" tin to his companion, while he maintained possession of a "Honey Drops" 
container (R. 059: 58-61, 68-69; R. 063: 56-59, 66-67). Each container held 
methamphetamine and cocaine (id.). Defendant pleaded guilty to four related charges in 
that case (R. 059: 56-57, 82-84). 
The incident involving defendant's parole officer was charged first and is 
referenced herein as case 120 (R. 059: 50-51, 56-57, 68-69; R. 063: 48-49, 66-67, 56-57). 
Defendant entered four guilty pleas in that case (R. 059: 56-57; R. 063: 58-59). The 
incidents involving sale of drugs to the confidential informant were charged several 
months later (R. 059: 50-51, 56-57, 68-69; R. 063: 48-49, 66-67, 56-57). The 
methamphetamine charge in case 059 was tried before the cocaine charge in case 063, 
with both trials ending in guilty verdicts (R. 059: 129, 133-36; R. 063: 126, 128-31). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Because defendant has not adequately briefed his claim, this Court should refuse to 
consider whether the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss these 
consolidated cases for an alleged violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401 through 403 
6 
(2003). Defendant's argument presents bare, conclusory statements without factual or 
legal support or development of any meaningful analysis. Because compliance with the 
briefing rule is mandatory, defendant's argument does not warrant appellate review. 
This Court should also refuse to reach the merits of defendant's second argument 
because it was not preserved for appeal. Defendant claims that his pre-trial motion to 
dismiss filed in both cases below encompassed an alternative argument; that the trial 
court dismiss case 021800063 ["063"] following defendant's conviction in case 
021800059 ["059"] because the charges arose from the same criminal episode, preventing 
him from being subjected to any further prosecutions upon entry of a conviction in case 
059, which was scheduled to go to trial first.3 However, a comparison of the motions and 
supporting documents filed in these consolidated cases establishes that the documents are 
identical and that neither document brings such an argument to the trial court's attention. 
As the claim was not preserved below, it should not be reviewed on appeal. 
Finally, defendant advances his second claim of error, in the alternative, under the 
plain error doctrine. However, he fails to establish the existence of any error, plain or 
otherwise, in the trial court's failure to sua sponte dismiss case 063 following defendant's 
conviction in case 059. The charges involved separate sales of two different substances 
3Defendant argues the cases in reverse, seeking dismissal of the methamphetamine 
charge in case 059 based on a previous conviction of the cocaine charge in case 063. Br. 
of Aplt. at 3, 5, 7-11. However, the cases were charged and tried in the order in which 
the sales occurred: first the methamphetamine sale, then the cocaine sale. Accordingly, 
the State responds to the argument with the cases in their proper order. 
7 
by defendant at two different times. Under this Court's precedent, defendant's sale of 
cocaine in case 063 necessarily had a different criminal objective than his sale of 
methamphetamine in case 059. In each case, the buyer wanted, and defendant intended to 
sell, a different illegal substance, which substance required different proof at trial. 
Hence, defendant's conviction of selling methamphetamine would not preclude his later 
prosecution for selling cocaine. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S SALE OF BOTH METHAMPHETAMINE AND 
COCAINE TO THE SAME CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AT 
TWO DIFFERENT TIMES ON THE SAME DAY DOES NOT ARISE 
OUT OF A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE AND, HENCE, DOES 
NOT REQUIRE THAT THE CHARGES BE TRIED IN A SINGLE 
TRIAL 
Defendant purports to present multiple arguments on appeal. First, he claims that 
the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss both consolidated cases at issue herein based 
on his prior conviction in case 011800120 ["120"]. Br. of Aplt at 7. Second, he claims 
that the motion to dismiss filed below included a request that the trial court dismiss case 
063 because prosecution of that case would be barred by the "single criminal offense" 
doctrine upon a conviction in case 059. Id. at 7-8. He argues that the trial court's failure 
to rule on this part of the motion constitutes error. Id. However, this Court need not 
reach the merits of these claims because: 1) defendant fails to adequately brief either 
argument; and 2) defendant failed to preserve the second argument for appellate review. 
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Finally, defendant alternatively argues that, even if he did not preserve his second 
claim below, the trial court's failure to dismiss case 063 once the jury had convicted 
defendant of the charge in case 059 amounted to plain error and warrants reversal. Id. at 
6-11. Specifically, he argues that his sale of illegal drugs to the same confidential 
informant at the same residence at two different times on the same day clearly constituted 
a single criminal episode which required that the two sales be charged in one case. Id. 
He reasons that his conviction in case 059, therefore, barred any further prosecution of 
case 063 under the "single criminal episode" doctrine, and failure to dismiss case 063 
amounted to obvious error. Id. Defendant's claim fails because the two sales involved 
different drugs and, hence, different criminal objectives which justified the separate 
prosecutions. 
A. Defendant's Failure to Adequately Brief His Challenge to the Trial Court's 
Denial of His Motion to Dismiss Warrants Rejection of the Claim 
Defendant claims that the facts show that all of the conduct relating to the two 
drug sales and his later arrest the same day arose from the same criminal episode. Br. of 
Aplt. at 6-7. He lists five alleged similarities between the charges in the instant 
consolidated cases, then baldly states: 
. . . the trial court should have granted [defendant's] Motion to Dismiss and 
dismissed cases 021800059 and 021800063 on the basis that [defendant] 
was convicted and sentenced in case 011800120 and therefore based on the 
provisions of Utah law[5] the doctrine of single criminal episode applied 
and any further convictions were barred by double jeopardy. 
9 
Id. at 7. Defendant presents no further argument in support of this issue, instead 
immediately moving to his next claim of error. Id. at 7-10. Neither does he request any 
relief for the claimed violation in his "Conclusion." Id. at 11. Instead, at one point, he 
concedes that "it is possible the trial court was correct" in its ruling that case 120 and the 
consolidated cases herein did not involve a single criminal episode. Id. at 10. 
Defendant's assertions are merely conclusory statements without factual or legal 
support, undeserving of appellate review. Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, outlining appellate briefing standards, requires that, in an appellate brief, the 
"argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented ... with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied 
on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). This implicitly requires not only citation to authority, but 
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority. See State v. 
Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, \ 26-27, 989 P.2d 503. Compliance with the briefing rules 
of this Court is mandatory, and appellate courts have repeatedly declined to consider 
inadequately briefed arguments on appeal. See id.; see also Beehive Telephone Co. v. 
Public Service Comm 'n of Utah, 2004 UT , Iffl 12-14, Utah Adv. Rep. ; State 
v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1 If 10, 973 P.2d 
404; Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 1996). It should do so now, in 
the face of defendant's failure to cite relevant legal authority or provide any meaningful 
analysis regarding his claim of error. See Utah R. App. P. 24 (a) (9). 
10 
B. Defendant did not Preserve his Claim that the Trial Court Erroneously 
Failed to Grant His Request that Case 063 Alone be Dismissed under 
the "Single Criminal Episode" Doctrine where no such Request was 
Made Below 
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charge in 
case 063 upon defendant's conviction in case 059 because both cases arose from a single 
criminal episode. Br. of Aplt. at 3, 5-6, 8. This Court should refuse to reach the merits of 
defendant's second argument because it was not preserved below. 
To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in the 
trial court, giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue. See Badger v. Brooklyn 
Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998), reh yg denied (Sep. 9, 1998); State v. Hardy, 
2002 UT App 244, % 15, 54 P.3d 645. It is well-established that a defendant who fails to 
bring an issue before the trial court is generally barred from raising it for the first time on 
appeal. See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 
P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App.1991). 
An issue is sufficiently raised to permit appellate review where the following three 
requirements are met: (1) it must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) it must be raised 
specifically; and (3) it must be accompanied by supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority. See State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45 f 6, 975 P.2d 476 (quotations omitted); 
Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, lj 15. 
Defendant argues that his motion to dismiss below included a claim that the charge 
in case 063 should be dismissed because it arose from the same criminal episode as the 
11 
charge in case 059, preventing separate prosecutions for the two charges. Br. of Aplt. at 
3, 5-6, 8. Anticipating a preservation argument from the State, defendant asserts that 
the original Motion to Dismiss listed first the request to dismiss both 
subsequent cases [059 and 063] and in the alternative a request to dismiss 
only 059 based on the filing of 063. 
Id. at 8 (bracketed information added). Defendant then goes on to argue plain error, 
without further explaining the preservation of his claim or arguing its merits. Id. 
A review of the motion and the supporting memorandum filed in these cases does 
not support defendant's claim. The motions and memoranda filed by defendant were 
identical (all are attached in Addendum D). The motion itself states: 
This Motion is made pursuant to Utah Code § 76-1-401, 402 and 
403. The statutes bar the state from prosecuting the Defendant for the 
present offense since the state previously prosecuted the Defendant for 
offenses occurring on the same date which were part of a single criminal 
episode which resulted in a conviction of the Defendant. 
(R. 059: 56; R. 063: 54). Add. D. This language does not preserve defendant's appellate 
argument for two reasons. First, use of the identical language in both motions does not 
alert the court that defendant intended to present two arguments in case 063 rather than 
the single argument he set forth in case 059. Second, at the time defendant filed his 
motions, the State had not yet "previously prosecuted" him to a conviction in case 059. 
The supporting memoranda are also identical. Add. D. They speak in terms of 
charges "following his arrest on November 7" and the "remaining charges" later brought 
against him; charges brought in November 2001, and charges brought in April 2002; 
12 
"charges presently being brought" and "previous charges which have been adjudicated;" 
and the prosecutor's knowledge of all the charges at the time "the initial information" was 
filed (R. 059: 52-53; R. 063: 50-51). Add. D. His recitation of authority consists of a 
brief description of two cases, and the statement that all the charges brought against him 
were charged under the same code section (R. 059: 53-54; R. 063: 56-57). Add. D. 
The only distinction made in the supporting memoranda is the one between the 
charges in case 020 and those in the consolidated cases herein. The only charges which 
had already been adjudicated at the time defendant filed his motions were those involved 
in case 020. Nothing in the identical memoranda suggested to the trial court that it should 
consider dismissing anything less than both the charges involved herein. 
Because the memoranda were not sufficiently specific to alert the trial court that a 
separate ruling involving the dismissal of only case 063 was requested, defendant did not 
sufficiently raise the issue below to preserve that issue for appellate review. See Hardy, 
2002UTApp244,1|l5. 
C. The Sale of Methamphetamine and the Sale of Cocaine in this Case do not 
Obviously Share a Single Criminal Objective and. Hence, do not Plainly Arise 
out of a Single Criminal Episode 
Of the three exceptions to the general rule of issue preservation recognized in 
Utah, defendant addresses only one—plain error. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208-09 (Utah 1993); Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922. He argues that regardless of what 
this Court finds he included in his motion to dismiss below, the trial court was on notice 
13 
that all the charges against him arose from the same facts and incidents and that defendant 
was concerned about being "unfairly bombarded with multiple criminal convictions" 
arising from a single criminal episode. Br. of Aplt. at 8-9. 
To obtain appellate relief through the doctrine of "plain error," an appellant must 
establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful." See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah App. 1996) 
(quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208), cert, denied 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). If appellant 
fails to prove one of these requirements, plain error is not established. Id. at 1209. 
In this case, defendant's argument is based on Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(1) 
(1999), which provides: 
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or 
should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the 
former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(ii) resulted in conviction[.] 
Add. B. Under section 76-1-402(2) (2003), if multiple charges arise out of a single 
criminal episode, a defendant cannot be subject to separate trials unless the court orders 
otherwise. Add. B. Thus, in order for the State to be barred from prosecuting defendant 
in case 063 for the felony charge of distribution of cocaine, this Court must find that the 
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charge was part of the same "criminal episode" as the charge of distribution of 
methamphetamine. 
The term "single criminal episode" is defined for purposes of this rule as "all 
conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401; see also 
State v. Keppler, 1999 UT App 89, \ 5, 976 P.2d 99. Accordingly, resolution of the 
remaining issue in this case depends upon a finding, under the plain error doctrine, as to 
whether defendant's sale of cocaine to a confidential informant is, under the specific facts 
of this case, "incident" to the accomplishment of the same criminal objective as 
defendant's sale of methamphetamine to the same informant earlier on the same day. 
Another panel of this Court addressed this issue in State v. Spaulding, 1999 UT 
App 324, T{ 3 (unpublished memorandum decision attached in Addendum E).4 In 
Spaulding, defendant pled guilty to possession of marijuana and to two other offenses. 
Id at 111. Add. E. Thereafter, he was prosecuted separately for possession of 
methamphetamine. Id. Add. E. On appeal, he argued, in part, that his prosecution for 
possession of methamphetamine after having been convicted of possession of marijuana 
4The State cites to Spaulding pursuant to Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, 
If 16, 44 P.3d 734 ("[Djecisions of the court of appeals expressed in a memorandum 
decision, or in an opinion, are equally binding upon lower courts of this state, and may be 
cited to the degree that they are useful, authoritatively and persuasively."). 
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subjected him to double jeopardy in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1), because 
the offenses were closely "related in time." Id. Add. E. 
This Court rejected defendant's claim with the following analysis: 
Similarly, Spaulding's possession of marijuana and possession of 
methamphetamine cannot be considered part of the same "criminal 
objective." Though the offenses are charged under the same general statute, 
they involve different subsections because they concern different drugs. 
Proof of Spaulding's possession of marijuana would not sustain a 
conviction for possession of methamphetamine and vice versa. 
Furthermore, in Keppler, 976 P.2d at 100, this court cited approvingly to 
cases from other jurisdictions concluding the statutory prohibition against 
multiple punishments for the same conduct does not preclude separate 
conviction for simultaneous possession of certain drugs. See People v. 
Mfojnarrez, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 247, 250 (Cal. App. 1998) (determining 
defendant was properly charged separately under the same code section for 
simultaneously possessing heroin and cocaine); Cunningham v. State, 567 
A.2d 126 (Md. Ct. 1989) (concluding defendant was correctly charged 
separately under same code section for simultaneously possessing heroin 
and cocaine); State v. Delfino, 490 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1986) (determining 
defendant was properly charged separately under same code section for 
simultaneously possessing cocaine and marijuana). Accordingly, Spaulding 
has not been subjected to double jeopardy. 
Spaulding, 1999 UT App 324, \ 3. Add. E. 
In this case, defendant was charged under the same statutory subsection with 
distribution of two different drugs (R. 059: 9-10; R. 063: 1-2). As with Spaulding, proof 
of defendant's distribution of methamphetamine "would not sustain a conviction" for 
distribution of cocaine and vice versa. Spaulding, 1999 UT App 324, \ 3. Add. E. 
Moreover, as recognized in Spaulding, the court's opinion in State v. Keppler, 
1999 UT App 89, 976 P.2d 99, supports this outcome. In that case, the court considered 
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whether Keppler's prior guilty plea to possession of drug paraphernalia precluded a later 
prosecution for possession of methamphetamine when the drug paraphernalia and the 
methamphetamine were found in Keppler's possession "at the same time and in the same 
location." Id. at % 4. The court held that the criminal objective in a possessory offense is 
determined by "the specific nature of the property possessed." Id. at ^ 6. Accordingly, 
where defendant's criminal objectives were to possess methamphetamine in one case and 
to possess drug paraphernalia in the other case, his objectives were different, and the 
charges were not part of the same criminal episode under section 76-1-401. Id. at ^} 5, 8. 
See also State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah App. 1995). 
In support of its analysis in Keppler, this Court cited approvingly to cases from 
other jurisdictions which involved the same basic challenge presented here: whether the 
statutory prohibition against multiple punishments for the same conduct would preclude 
separate conviction for simultaneous possession of two different drugs. Id. at \ 6. In 
most of the cases cited, the separate possessory offenses were charged under the same 
code section, and the separate charging of those offenses was held to be proper. See 
People v. Monarrez, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 247 (Cal. App. 1998) (defendant was properly 
charged separately under the same code section for simultaneous possession of heroin 
and cocaine); Cunningham v. State, 567 A.2d 126 (Md. App. 1989) (same); State v. 
Delfino, 490 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1986) (defendant was properly charged separately under 
the same code section for simultaneous possession of cocaine and marijuana). While 
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these cases involved possessory offenses, the same reasoning would apply to the instant 
distribution charges. 
Further, the distinction between different controlled substances has been 
recognized by the Utah Legislature. Although possession of controlled substances is 
generally prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8, the code treats drug offenses 
differently based on the specific type of controlled substance at issue. "The narcotics are 
separately classified and regulated by the Legislature; they have different effects and 
pose different hazards to society." Monarrez, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d at 250. 
In addition, there is no reasonably characterized "singular criminal objective" for 
these offenses asserted by defendant. Defendant claims that the common objective of 
both of the charged offenses was "to sell drugs to Springer." Br. of Aplt. at 10. Such a 
characterization of the purpose of the charged offenses could hardly be stated more 
broadly, and is the equivalent of saying that defendant's purpose was "to break the law." 
At this level of generality, almost any combination of crimes would fall under the single 
criminal episode rule. Instead, as Keppler requires, the criminal objective of defendant's 
acts must be characterized in terms of the specific substance at issue: defendant's 
objective in one offense was to sell cocaine and in the other was to sell 
methamphetamine. Thus, in each case, defendant's purpose was not simply to sell an 
illegal substance; it was to sell a particular drug which has particular properties. See 
State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah App. 1995) (the objectives of the criminal acts 
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are to be construed narrowly for purposes of determining whether they constitute a single 
criminal episode under section 76-1-401), cert denied 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996); see 
also State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (the offenses cannot be treated as a 
single criminal episode under section 76-1-401 because "although the testimony given 
may overlap, the offenses are different and the proof requirements are different"). 
Moreover, the sales occurred separately, with the informant leaving for several hours 
before returning to make the second purchase, emphasizing that the second transaction 
was in no way necessary to accomplishment of the criminal objective involved with the 
first transaction. 
Accordingly, defendant's sale of cocaine to a confidential informant in this case is 
not "incident" to the accomplishment of the same criminal objective as defendant's sale 
of methamphetamine to the same informant on the same day, and defendant's claim of 
plain error fails. 
Defendant does not recognize the need for this Court to make this finding because 
he claims that "the same drug, methamphetamine, was sold on both occasions[.]" Br. of 
Aplt. at 7. Specifically, he asserts "that case 059 is identical to case 063[.]" Id. at 10. He 
asserts that his two "acts of selling drugs to Susie Springer on November 7, 2001 were 
one criminal objective[,]" that there "was one criminal intention-to sell drugs to Springer, 
one general impulse-to deal drugs from [one person's] house; one plan-to deal 
methamphetamine." Id. He continues, "Even if there was more than one act or a series of 
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acts or transactions there was one offense—dealing methamphetamine to Susie Springer." 
Id, Moreover, in support of his claims, he asserts, in part, that "the affidavits of probable 
cause to support the arrest and Information were identical in both cases 021800059 and 
021800063." Id. at 7. 
Defendant fails to provide record citation to support his claim that he intended to, 
and did, sell only methamphetamine to the informant. Moreover, the record demonstrates 
repeatedly that only one of the two sales and subsequent charges involved 
methamphetamine, while the other involved cocaine. 
The record in case 059 is replete with references to the sale of methamphetamine, 
including: the information (R. 059:2-3); the warrant of arrest (R. 059: 4); the affidavit of 
probable cause (R. 059: 5-8); the amended information (R. 059: 9-10); the verdict (R. 
059: 129); the jury instructions (R. 059: 111, 113, 114, 126); and the judgment, 
commitment & order (R. 059: 164-65). The record in case 063 contains similar 
references relating, instead, to cocaine (R. 063: 1-7, 26-27, 110, 112, 113, 125, 126, 138-
42). Defendant's memorandum supporting his motion to dismiss recites the facts as 
involving a sale of methamphetamine and a sale of cocaine (R. 059: 50-51; R. 063: 48-
49). 
Even defendant's appellate brief is internally inconsistent with his claim that he 
sold only methamphetamine to the informant. In his fact statement, defendant notes that 
the informant first purchased methamphetamine from him, then later "made a second 
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purchase of drugs." Br. of Aplt. at 4. In the next paragraph, defendant says that he went 
into town after he "had engaged in the two sales of cocaine" to the informant. Id. 
(emphasis added). Thereafter, in his argument, defendant argues that both sales involved 
"one plan—to deal methamphetamine." Id. at 10. 
Further, defendant's assertion that his claim is supported, in part, by the "fact" that 
the probable cause affidavits in these cases are "identical" is belied by the record. Id. at 
7. A review of the affidavits reveals that there is very little in the two documents that is 
"identical" (R. 059: 5-8; R. 063: 4-7) (attached in Addendum F). They were sworn to by 
different affiants, the affiants held different jobs, they attested to different activities, and, 
most importantly, their statements involved different drugs (id.). Add. F. Accordingly, 
under the facts as established by the record in this case, defendant was properly charged, 
in separate proceedings, with the distribution of methamphetamine and cocaine. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
defendant's convictions in these consolidated cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 9 day of March, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
fS C. LEONA 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee were hand-delivered/mailed first class, postage pre-paid, to Julie George, 
attorney for defendant/appellant, 32 Exchange Place, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah 








Titles 58 and 58A 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalt ies: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, i t is unlawful for a n y person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess w i th in t en t to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or ar range to distr ibute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance w i t h in t en t to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person part icipates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d t h a t is a felony; a n d 
(B) the violation is a pa r t of a contiiiuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions t ha t a re under taken in concert wi th five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of managemen t . 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) w i th respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or mar i juana , is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guil ty of 
a th i rd degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an inde te rmina te 
term as provided by law, but if the t r ier of fact finds a firearm as defined 
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in fur therance of t he 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; a n d the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an inde te rmina te t e r m 
not to exceed five years to rim, consecutively and not concurrently. 
of not less than seven years and winch may De lor lite, imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not*be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) I t is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless i t was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in t h e course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant , licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; or 
(hi) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or writ ten order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more t han 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the mar i juana is not in the form of a n extracted 
resin from any par t of the plant , and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less t han 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, t h a t person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty t han provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including less t han one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction t he person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a th i rd degree 
felony. 
Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) I t is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist , vete 
in&rian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or a t t empt 1 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescri t 
or dispense to any person known to be at tempting to acquire or obtai 
possession of, or to procure the administrat ion of any controlle 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose bu 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, for^ 
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or wri t ten orde 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or wri t ten order for 
controlled substance, or to u t te r the same, or to alter any prescriptio 
or wri t ten order issued or wri t ten under the terms of this chapter; c 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, c 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the t r ademar l 
t rade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another c 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container c 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person nc 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to b 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, U tah Drug Paraphe i 
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substance 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications unde 
Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on t h 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti 
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or insti tutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or othe 
s tructure or grounds which are, a t the t ime of the act, being used fo 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution unde 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, s tadium, arena, thea te i 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or s t ructure adjacent thereto 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds includec 
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years o 
age, regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a firsi 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years 
if the penalty tha t would otherwise have been established but for this 
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or executior 
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(c) If the classification t ha t would otherwise have been established 
would have been less t h a n a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), 
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more 
than the maximum penalty prescribed for t h a t offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) t h a t the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older a t 
the t ime of the offense or was unaware of the individual's t rue age; nor 
tha t the actor mistakenly believed t h a t the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware t h a t the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrat ive penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another s tate for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this s tate . 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is pr ima facie evidence t ha t 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans , from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the Sub-
stances to be administered by an ass is tant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practi-
tioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 







Titles 76 and 77 
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Joinder of 
offenses and defendants. 
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single 
criminal episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is 
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section 
77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal 
proceedings. 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
;ode, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
my other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
lefendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney a t the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
harged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
ffense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an at tempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a s tatute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
ncluded offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
lefendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
ourt on appeal or certiorari, shall determine tha t there is insufficient evidence 
o support a conviction for the offense charged but tha t there is sufficient^ 
vidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the tr ier of fact" 
Lecessarily found every fact required for conviction of tha t included offense, 
be verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
ldgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
ew trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent pre 
cution for offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising 
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same < 
different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense t h a t was or should 1 
been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; a 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defenc 
tha t has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and tha t necesss 
required a determination inconsistent with a fact t h a t must 
established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not gi 
by the tr ier of facts or in a determination t h a t there was insufficient evide 
to war ran t conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense ig 
acquittal of the greater offense even though the conviction for t h e lei 
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of g 
tha t has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty t h a t h a s 
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and t h a t is capable of support in 
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the terminat ion ta 
place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and ta 
place after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to t ry the defendant, or, if 
ju ry tr ial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, terminatioi 
prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his r ight to object to the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record t h a t the terminat ior 
necessary because: 
(i) I t is physically impossible to proceed with the tr ial in confornc 
with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not a t t r ibutable to 
s ta te tha t would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reve 
ible as a mat te r of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not a t t r ibu ta 
to the s ta te makes it impossible to proceed wi th the t r ia l with< 
injustice to the defendant or the state; or 
(iv) The ju ry is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 




DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
NOV 0 1 2002 
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK 
RV fJ\ DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KYLE KENT STRTNGHAM, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Criminal No. 021800063 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The Court having received defendant's Motion to Dismiss, plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition, and defendant's Reply, and the matter having come before the Court for oral 
argument on October 28, 2002, having reviewed the pleadings, receiving argument and being 
otherwise folly informed, enters the following: 
The issue before the Court is whether the acts of the defendant were within a single 
criminal episode, which should have been tried in defendant's previous case. Defendant 
correctly argues that UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-403, prohibits the subsequent prosecution of an 
offense that should have been tried under section 402(2) and the former prosecution in this case 
resulted in a conviction. Section 76-1-402(2) mandates the defendant should not be subject to 
separate trials where the conduct occurred as part of a single criminal episode in the jurisdiction 
of one court, and the offenses were known to the prosecution at defendant's arraignment for the 
first information. A single criminal episode is defined in § 76-1-401 as "all conduct which is 
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective." As mentioned earlier, the only issue before the Court is whether defendant's actions 
satisfy both prongs of the single criminal episode statute, and would thereby preclude the current 
prosecution. 
Applying the facts to the second prong of the statutory requirements, under a totality of 
circumstances approach, defendant's actions were not part of a single criminal objective. As the 
plaintiff argues, the previous case involved defendant's criminal objective to possess the drugs 
and to conceal those drugs when approached by his parole officer, and by handing them to his 
cohort. Defendant was not involved in a sale of the drugs when arrested. His possession at that 
point was not incident to the accomplishment of the same criminal objective as the charge in the 
case sub judice, i e., selling drugs for money. Defendant cites to Commonwealth v McPhail 
631 A 2d 1305 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) in support of his argument. In McPhail the defendant had 
been involved in three separate and completed drug transactions with undercover agents. Unlike 
McPhail our defendant, had allegedly been involved in two previous completed drug 
transactions, and then was subsequently arrested when his parole officer conducted an in filed 
investigation, based upon information he had gained from the prior sales and through a 
confidential informant. 
While it is true that defendant is charged in both cases under 58-37-8, a case can be easily 
envisioned where a defendant is involved in two drug transactions, would be charged under the 
same statute, but would not constitute a single criminal episode. Rather, to be part of a single 
criminal episode, the statute requires the actions to be closely related in time and the defendant 
must possess a common criminal objective in both offenses. In the present case, the second 
prong is not satisfied as there was no single criminal objective, and where the prior offense was a 
completed and separate offense from the subsequent offense for which defendant was arrested 
and convicted. As the case is determined under the second prong, it is unnecessary to address the 
first prong or temporal requirement of the statute 
Based upon the above-mentioned, and the reasoning found in the memoranda, and 
presented at oral argument, it is hereby ORDERED, defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED 
Dated this ^ f day of October, 2002. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 021800059 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JOEL D BERRETT 
ATTORNEY DEF 
58 EAST 100 NORTH 
P.O. BOX 2 62 
ROOSEVELT, UT 84066 
By Hand HERBERT W. GILLESPIE 
Dated this _[ day of fb'J , 20 hi . 
U Hk. 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
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JOEL D. BERRETT #0307 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 2 62 V 




DUCHESNE COUNTY. UTAH 
SEP 1 B 2002 
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK 
BY- l / k ^ i DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - DUCHESNE COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KYLE KENT STRINGHAM, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 021800059 
Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by his attorney, and moves the above-
entitled Court for an Order Dismissing charges presently pending 
against the Defendant in the above entitled Court. 
This Motion is made pursuant to Utah Code § 76-1-401, 402 and 
403. The statutes bar the state from prosecuting the Defendant for 
the present offense since the state previously prosecuted the 
Defendant for offenses occurring on the same date which were part 
of a single criminal episode which resulted in a conviction of the 
Defendant. 
DATED this //? day of September, 2002. 
4 
JQ^L D. BERRETT 
:orney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this /& day of September, 
2 002, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion to Continue and Order to Continue to: 
Herbert Wm. Gillespie 
Deputy Duchesne County Attorney 
P.O. Box 206 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 




DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
SEP 1 a 2002 
JOEL D. BERRETT #0307 JOANNE McKEE, CLERK 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t BY TI^LS HFPI ITV 
P.O. Box 262 
R o o s e v e l t , Utah 84066 
(435) 722-3606 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - DUCHESNE COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
Plaintiff, : OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
vs. : 
KYLE KENT STRINGHAM, : Case No. 021800059 
Defendant. : Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by his attorney, and in support of 
the Motion to Dismiss filed with the Court respectfully submits the 
following memorandum. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On and prior to November 7, 2001 Susie Springer was 
engaged as a compensated confidential informant for the Plaintiff. 
2. On November 7, 2001, Ms. Springer contacted agents of the 
Plaintiff and indicated that she was aware of an opportunity to buy 
illegal drugs from Carol Catoor. 
3. Ms. Springer met with agents of the Plaintiff in 
Roosevelt where arrangements were made to complete a purchase of 
illegal drugs from Ms. Catoor in Neola, Utah. 
1 
4. Ms. Springer and agents of the Plaintiff then traveled to 
the home of Ms. Catoor in Neola where Ms. Springer allegedly 
purchased methamphetamine from the Defendant who was present and in 
possession of the drugs at the time of transfer. 
5. Later that day, Ms. Springer again met with the agents of 
the Plaintiff in Roosevelt, Utah and made arrangements to make 
another purchase of illegal drugs from the Defendant. 
6. Ms. Springer and agents of the Plaintiff then went to the 
home of Ms. Catoor in Neola where Ms. Springer allegedly made a 
purchase of cocaine from the Defendant. 
7. Following the alleged purchase, Ms. Springer met with 
agents of the state and indicated that Defendant still had illegal 
drugs for sale. 
8. Immediately thereafter, an agent of the state traveled 
toward Defendant's mother's home and found Defendant in his pickup 
where he was arrested for possession of cocaine and methamphetamine 
with intent to distribute. 
9. The state filed charges against the Defendant in 
November, 2001. The Defendant was sentenced on May 6, 2002 for 
distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance, 
cocaine a second degree felony; distribution of or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance, methamphetamine, a second degree 
felony; possession or use of a controlled substance with prior 
conviction, methamphetamine, a second degree felony; and possession 
or use of a controlled substance with a prior conviction, cocaine, 
2 
a second degree felony. 
10. Charges against Defendant for the alleged drug sales 
occurring on November 7, 2 001, were not filed until April, 2 002. 
11. Jury trials are scheduled for Defendant on the instant 
case for November, 2002. 
AGRUMENT 
Utah Code § 76-1-403 in relevant part states: 
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one 
or more offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution 
for the same or a different offense arising 
out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an 
offense that was or should have been 
tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) 
in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(ii) resulted in conviction; 
Utah Code § 76-1-402 in relevant part states: 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate 
offenses under a single criminal episode, 
unless the court otherwise orders to promote 
justice, a defendant shall not be subject 
to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction 
of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the 
prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
Utah Code § 76-1-401 in relevant part states: 
*single criminal episode" means all conduct 
which is closely related in time and is 
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment 
of a single criminal objective. 
3 
As the statutes make clear, if a defendant is involved in more 
than one offense arising out of a single criminal episode and he is 
prosecuted on some of the offenses, further prosecution for other 
offenses are barred if the former prosecution resulted in a 
conviction. Utah Code § 76-1-403. This is consistent with what 
happened in this case. Allegedly the Defendant was in Duchesne 
County to sell illegal drugs. He allegedly made two drug sales and 
was arrested for possession with intent to distribute all on the 
same day. The information that he had additional drugs was 
obtained from the confidential informant. All of the offenses 
involving the Defendant occurred on the same day, involved the same 
officers and occurred in the same county. 
According to Utah Code § 76-1-402(2) if conduct establishes 
separate offenses under a single criminal episode, the offenses are 
within the jurisdiction of a single court and the offenses are 
known to the prosecuting attorney then the defendant may not be 
subject to separate trials for multiple offenses. It is clear that 
at the time the initial information was filed that the state, its 
officers and attorneys were aware of all of the charges that could 
be brought against the Defendant. In fact, the charges presently 
being brought were allegedly committed earlier on the same day as 
the previous charges which have been adjudicated. The state could 
not argue that the offenses are not within the jurisdiction of the 
court or that the prosecuting attorney did not know of all the 
offenses allegedly committed by the Defendant. A conscious choice 
4 
was made to bring some of the charges against the Defendant 
following his arrest on November 7, 2001 and to later bring the 
remaining charges against the Defendant. 
All of the charges brought against the Defendant are closely 
related in time and are incident to an attempt or an accomplishment 
of a single criminal objective. Assuming the state's evidence to 
be true, the Defendant was in Duchesne County, Utah in possession 
of methamphetamine and cocaine which he intended to sell. One sale 
occurred in the morning of November 7, 2001. Another sale occurred 
in the afternoon of November 7, 2 001. The Defendant was arrested 
shortly after the second sale and charges for possession were 
brought against him. He plead guilty to four second degree felonies 
involving possession and distribution of methamphetamine and 
possession and distribution of cocaine. Those charges were 
initially brought in November, 2001. In April, 2002, charges were 
brought against the Defendant alleging that he had distributed 
cocaine and methamphetamine. 
The court in State v. Crosby, 927 P 2d 638 (Utah 1996) stated 
that if there is but one intention, one general impulse, and one 
plan, even thought there is a serious of transactions, there is but 
one offense. 
In State v. Keppler, 976 P 2d 99 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) the 
court indicated: "The specific nature of the property possessed 
determines the offense in a possession offense. In this case, we 
note that the property implicated in the two charges is not of the 
5 
same quality. The Legislature expressly prohibits the possession 
of drug paraphernalia and the possession of methamphetamine as 
separate statutory offenses." 
In the Keppler case, the Court allowed the plaintiff to 
separately prosecute a charge of possession of paraphernalia from 
possession of methamphetamine. 
In this case, all charges brought against the Defendant are 
charged under Utah Code § 58-37-8. 
CONCLUSION 
The charges pending against the Defendant at the present time 
should be dismissed based on the law referred to above. 
DATED this /LS day of September, 2002. 
JOEy D. BERRETT 
Attorney for Defendant 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this JV day of September, 
2 002, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum to: 
Herbert Wm. Gillespie 
Deputy Duchesne County Attorney 
P.O. Box 206 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 




JOEL D. BERRETT #0307 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 262 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
(435) 722-3606 
BY. 
. DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
SEPfWEH 
JOANNE McljEE, CLERK 
.DEPUTY 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - DUCHESNE COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KYLE KENT STRINGHAM, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 021800063 
Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by his attorney, and moves the above-
entitled Court for an Order Dismissing charges presently pending 
against the Defendant in the above entitled Court. 
This Motion is made pursuant to Utah Code § 76-1-401, 402 and 
403. The statutes bar the state from prosecuting the Defendant for 
the present offense since the state previously prosecuted the 
Defendant for offenses occurring on the same date which were part 
of a single criminal episode which resulted in a conviction of the 
Defendant. 
DATED this day of September, 2002. 
JQJJL D. BERRETT 
:orney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this day of September, 
2002, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion to Continue and Order to Continue to: 
Herbert Wm. Gillespie 
Deputy Duchesne County Attorney 
P.O. Box 206 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
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DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
JOEL D. BERRETT #0307 
Attorney for Defendant 
P.O. Box 262 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
(435) 722-3606 
BY. 
SEP 1 8 2002 
JOANNE MdfEE, CLERK 
.DEPUTY 
J cK  
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - DUCHESNE COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KYLE KENT STRINGHAM, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 021800063 
Judge: JOHN R. ANDERSON 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by his attorney, and in support of 
the Motion to Dismiss filed with the Court respectfully submits the 
following memorandum. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On and prior to November 7, 2001 Susie Springer was 
engaged as a compensated confidential informant for the Plaintiff. 
2. On November 7, 2001, Ms. Springer contacted agents of the 
Plaintiff and indicated that she was aware of an opportunity to buy 
illegal drugs from Carol Catoor. 
3. Ms. Springer met with agents of the Plaintiff in 
Roosevelt where arrangements were made to complete a purchase of 
illegal drugs from Ms. Catoor in Neola, Utah. 
1 
4. Ms. Springer and agents of the Plaintiff then traveled to 
the home of Ms, Catoor in Neola where Ms. Springer allegedly 
purchased methamphetamine from the Defendant who was present and in 
possession of the drugs at the time of transfer. 
5. Later that day, Ms. Springer again met with the agents of 
the Plaintiff in Roosevelt, Utah and made arrangements to make 
another purchase of illegal drugs from the Defendant. 
6. Ms. Springer and agents of the Plaintiff then went to the 
home of Ms. Catoor in^  Neola where Ms. Springer allegedly made a 
purchase of cocaine from the Defendant. 
7. Following the alleged purchase, Ms. Springer met with 
agents of the state and indicated that Defendant still had illegal 
drugs for sale. 
8. Immediately thereafter, an agent of the state traveled 
toward Defendant's mother's home and found Defendant in his pickup 
where he was arrested for possession of cocaine and me thamphet amine 
with intent to distribute. 
9. The state filed charges against the Defendant in 
November, 2001. The Defendant was sentenced on May 6, 2002 for 
distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance, 
cocaine a second degree felony; distribution of or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance, methamphetainine, a second degree 
felony; possession or use of a controlled substance with prior 
conviction, methamphetamine, a second degree felony; and possession 
or use of a controlled substance with a prior conviction, cocaine, 
2 
a second degree felony. 
10. Charges against Defendant for the alleged drug sales 
occurring on November 7, 2001, were not filed until April, 2002. 
11. Jury trials are scheduled for Defendant on the instant 
case for November, 2002. 
AGRUMENT 
Utah Code § 76-1-403 in relevant part states: 
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one 
or more offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution 
for the same or a different offense arising 
out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an 
offense that was or should have been 
tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) 
in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(ii) resulted in conviction; 
Utah Code § 7 6-1-402 in relevant part states: 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate 
offenses under a single criminal episode, 
unless the court otherwise orders to promote 
justice, a defendant shall not be subject 
to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction 
of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the 
prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
Utah Code § 7 6-1-401 in relevant part states: 
''single criminal episode" means all conduct 
which is closely related in time and is 
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment 
of a single criminal objective. 
3 
As the statutes make clear, if a defendant is involved in more 
than one offense arising out of a single criminal episode and he is 
prosecuted on some of the offenses, further prosecution for other 
offenses are barred if the former prosecution resulted in a 
conviction. Utah Code § 76-1-403. This is consistent with what 
happened in this case. Allegedly the Defendant was in Duchesne 
County to sell illegal drugs. He allegedly made two drug sales and 
was arrested for possession with intent to distribute all on the 
same day. The information that he had additional drugs was 
obtained from the confidential informant. All of the offenses 
involving the Defendant occurred on the same day, involved the same 
officers and occurred in the same county. 
According to Utah Code § 76-1-402(2) if conduct establishes 
separate offenses under a single criminal episode, the offenses are 
within the jurisdiction of a single court and the offenses are 
known to the prosecuting attorney then the defendant may not be 
subject to separate trials for multiple offenses. It is clear that 
at the time the initial information was filed that the state, its 
officers and attorneys were aware of all of the charges that could 
be brought against the Defendant. In fact, the charges presently 
being brought were allegedly committed earlier on the same day as 
the previous charges which have been adjudicated. The state could 
not argue that the offenses are not within the jurisdiction of the 
court or that the prosecuting attorney did not know of all the 
offenses allegedly committed by the Defendant. A conscious choice 
4 
was made to bring some of the charges against the Defendant 
following his arrest on November 7, 2001 and to later bring the 
remaining charges against the Defendant, 
All of the charges brought against the Defendant are closely-
related in time and are incident to an attempt or an accomplishment 
of a single criminal objective. Assuming the state's evidence to 
be true, the Defendant was in Duchesne County, Utah in possession 
of methamphetamine and cocaine which he intended to sell. One sale 
occurred in the morning of November 7, 2001. Another sale occurred 
in the afternoon of November 7, 2 001. The Defendant was arrested 
shortly after the second sale and charges for possession were 
brought against him. He plead guilty to four second degree felonies 
involving possession and distribution of methamphetamine and 
possession and distribution of cocaine. Those charges were 
initially brought in November, 2001. In April, 2002, charges were 
brought against the Defendant alleging that he had distributed 
cocaine and methamphetamine. 
The court in State v. Crosby, 927 P 2d 638 (Utah 1996) stated 
that if there is but one intention, one general impulse, and one 
plan, even thought there is a serious of transactions, there is but 
one offense. 
In State v. Keppler, 976 P 2d 99 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) the 
court indicated: "The specific nature of the property possessed 
determines the offense in a possession offense. In this case, we 
note that the property implicated in the two charges is not of the 
5 
same quality. The Legislature expressly prohibits the possession 
of drug paraphernalia and the possession of methamphetamine as 
separate statutory offenses." 
In the Keppler case, the Court allowed the plaintiff to 
separately prosecute a charge of possession of paraphernalia from 
possession of methamphetamine. 
In this case, all charges brought against the Defendant are 
charged under Utah Code § 58-37-8. 
CONCLUSION 
The charges pending against the Defendant at the present time 
should be dismissed based on the law referred to above. 
DATED this //) day of September, 2002. 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this day of September, 
2002, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum to: 
Herbert Wm. Gillespie 
Deputy Duchesne County Attorney 
P.O. Box 2 06 
Duchesne, Utah 84021 
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*1 Spaulding pleaded guilty to possession of 
marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and a 
traffic offense. He asserts he was subjected to 
double jeopardy in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-402(1) (1999) for being prosecuted separately 
for possession of methamphetamine. We disagree. 
"A defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal action for all separate offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1- 402(1) (1999). A "single criminal episode" is 
defined as "all conduct which is closely related in 
time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Id. 
at § 76-1-401 (1999). It is undisputed that the first 
requirement, "related in time," was met. However, 
we agree with the trial court that the offenses for 
which Spaulding pleaded guilty and the one for 
which he was prosecuted do not satisfy the second 
prong, "accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective." In State v. Keppler, 976 P.2d 99 (Utah 
Ct.App.1999), involving a fact situation which 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
Page 1 
closely parallels this case, defendant pleaded guilty 
to possessing paraphernalia and was then charged 
with possessing methamphetamine. Id. at 99. This 
court rejected defendant's double jeopardy claim 
because the legislature made possession of drug 
paraphernalia and possession of methamphetamine 
separate offenses and therefore did not establish the 
"same criminal objective prong." Id. at 100. For the 
same reason, Spaulding's possession of drug 
paraphernalia and the traffic offense cannot be 
considered the "same criminal objective" as his 
charge for possession of methamphetamine. 
Similarly, Spaulding's possession of marijuana and 
possession of methamphetamine cannot be 
considered part of the same "criminal objective." 
Though the offenses are charged under the same 
general statute, they involve different subsections 
because they concern different drugs. Proof of 
Spaulding's possession of marijuana would not 
sustain a conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine and vice versa. Furthermore, in 
Keppler, 976 P.2d at 100, this court cited 
approvingly to cases from other jurisdictions 
concluding the statutory prohibition against 
multiple punishments for the same conduct does not 
preclude separate conviction for simultaneous 
possession of certain drugs. See People v. Manarrez, 
78 Cal.Rptr.2d 247, 250 (Cal.Ct.App.1998) 
(determining defendant was properly charged 
separately under same code section for 
simultaneously possessing heroin and cocaine); 
Cunningham v. State, 567 A.2d 126 (Md.Ct.1989) 
(concluding defendant was correctly charged 
separately under same code section for 
simultaneously possessing heroin and cocaine); 
State v. Delfino, 490 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1986) 
(determining defendant was properly charged 
separately under same code section for 
simultaneously possessing cocaine and marijuana). 
Accordingly, Spaulding has not been subjected to 
double jeopardy. 
Affirmed. 
1999 WL 33244799 (Utah App.), 1999 UT App 324 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Addendum F 
8TH DISTRICT COURT STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF 
vs 
KYLE KENT STRINGHAM 
D-O-B. 
4-11-59 
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
CASE NO. 
APR ) 3 2X2 
JOANNE UcKEE, CLERK 
B Y
 • £ L ~ DEPUTY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE ) 
I, Brad Draper do hereby make solemn oath and declare that, 
I am a certified peace officer in the State of Utah. 
That I am employed as an Agent with the Department of Correction, Adult Probation and 
Parole and that I am an Agent of the Uintah Basin Narcotic Strike Force, charged with the 
enforcement and investigation of criminal activity within the State of Utah. 
1. That on 11-7-01 this Affiant began an investigation involving the Illegal Distribution of 
a Controlled Substance. (Methamphetamine) On 11-7-01 at approximately 08:15 hours this 
Affiant received a telephone call from CI # 01-222. The informant advised this Affiant that 
he/she had been contacted by Carol Keser and that a shipment of Methamphetamine had 
arrived at her house. Ms. Keser told CI # 01-222 to come to her house to make the drug 
transaction. 
2. At 09:27 hours this Affiant placed an audio transmitting device on the informant This 
Affiant searched CI # 01-222 person. No drugs, money or contraband were located. At 
09:42 hours this Affiant issued the informant $ 250.00 dollars to purchase narcotics. 
At 09:43 hours a telephone call was made by the informant to the Carol Keser residence 
in Neola, Utah. During this telephone call Carol Keser again confirmed to Ci # 01-222 that 
the drugs had arrived at her house and to come and gets some.. 
3. At 09:47 hours this Affiant drove CI # 01-222 to Neola. Officer derek Nelson followed 
us in a red and white Chevy truck that was equipped with the receiving device. We met on 
the south side of the Neola LDS church parking lot at which time this Affiant exited the 
vehicle the informant was driving. This Affiant searched the informants vehicle. No drugs, 
money or contraband were located. 
4. CI #01-222 drove a few blocks away to the Carol Keser residence. The informant made 
with a female he/she called, "Carol". Once inside the Carol Keser residence this Affiant 
heard CI # 01-222 begin talking about a drug transaction with a male he/she called, Kyle. 
At 10:10 hours this Affiant heard the informant count out money to Kyle who then handed 
methamphetamine to the informant. This Affiant heard Kyle tell the informant he had more 
methamphetamine and cocaine for sale. This Affiant heard CI # 01-222 tell Kyle that 
he/she wanted to buy an eight ball of cocaine and that he/she would pick it up later in the 
afternoon. CI # 01-222 left the Keser residence at 10:17 hours and traveled southbound 
on the Neola highway with this Affiant and Officer Nelson following behind. This Affiant 
and Officer Nelson followed him/her to the North Cresent area where a debrief interview 
was conducted. 
5.This Affiant, Officer Nelson and CI # 01-222 arrived at a safe meeting place at 10:30 
hours. This Affiant was handed two individual baggies of methamphetamine from the 
informant at 10:30 hours. Also at this time (10:30 hours) this Affiant conducted another 
search of CI # 01-222 person. No drugs, money or contraband were located. Officer 
Nelson conducted a search of the vehicle CI # 01-222 was driving. He did not locate any 
drugs, money or contraband. 
6. During a debrief interview this Affiant was told by the informant that he/she traveled to 
the Carol Keser residence in Neola. That he/she spoke with Carol Keser and Kyle 
Stringham. That she gave Kyle Stringham $ 250.00 dollars in exchange for 1 3/4 grams 
of methamphetamine. That Kyle Stringham advised CI # 01-222 he had more 
methamphetamine and cocaine for sale. CI #01-222 stated he/she ordered and eight ball 
of cocaine and would pick it up later in the day. 
7. That the above described controlled substance purchased was examined by 
experienced members of the task force and that it did appear to be methamphetamine. 
The substance was packaged in small zip lock baggies which is common for 
methamphetamine. That it had the color and texture that methamphetamine is commonly 
known to have. That it was told to the informant by Kyle Stringham that it was 
methamphetamine. 
8. This Affiant has probable cause to believe and does believe that Kyle Kent Stringham 
has committed the offense of "Distribution of a Controlled Substance" in violation of Utah 
code 58-37-8 and has been correctly identified by the informant. 
THESE OFFENSE OCCURRED WITHIN DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
AFFIANT OFFICER 
THIS AFFIDAVIT WAS SWORN TO BEFORE ME BY AFFIANT ON THIS 
DAY OFfffo^ 200, 
5ISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
8TH DISTRICT COURT STATE OF UTAH 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF 
vs 
KYLE KENT STRINGHAM 
D-O-B. 
04-11-59 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE ) 
I DEREK NELSON DO HEREBY MAKE SOLEMN OATH AND DECLARE THAT. 
I AM A CERTIFIED PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH, AND AM 
EMPLOYED AS AN OFFICER WITH THE ROOSEVELT CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
AND AGENT OF THE UINTAH BASIN NARCOTICS STRIKE FORCE. CHARGED WITH 
THE ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WITHIN THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
1. THAT ON 11-07-01 THIS AFFIANT BEGAN AN INVESTIGATION OF A 
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
FiLED 
DISTRICT COURT 
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DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE CASE. THAT ON 11-07-01 THIS 
AFFIANT, A.P.&P. AGENT DRAPER, AND AP&P SECRETARY SHERRIE BROWKAW 
MET WITH C.I. 01-222. THAT C.I. 01-222 INFORMED THIS AFFIANT THAT HE/SHE 
HAD MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO PURCHASE AN "EIGHTBALL" OF COCAINE FROM 
KYLE STRINGHAM. C.I. 01-222 SAID THE TRANSACTION WAS TO TAKE PLACE AT 
THE CAROL KEISER RESIDENCE IN NEOLA. 
2. THATON 11-7-01 AGENTDRAPER CONDUCTED A SEARCH OF C.I. 01-222'S 
PERSON AND VEHICLE. THAT NO MONEY OR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES WERE 
LOCATED. THAT AGENT DRAPER DID GIVE C.I. 01-222 AN AUDIO TRANSMITTING 
DEVICE, THAT WAS PLACED ON THE HIS/HER PERSON. THAT THIS AFFIANT DID 
ISSUE C.I. 01-222 TWO HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS FOR THE PURCHASE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. 
3. THAT THIS AFFIANT FOLLOWED C.I. 01-222 AND OBSERVED THAT 
HE/SHE DID GO TO THE CAROL KIESER RESIDENCE IN NEOLA. THAT CI 012-222 
WAS INSIDE THE RESIDENCE FOR APPROXIMATELY 10 MINUTES. THAT THIS 
AFFIANT HEARD C.I. 01-222 PAY A MAN TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE DOLLARS, 
AND THEN HE/SHE SAID THANK YOU. THAT THIS AFFIANT HEARD THE MALE MAKE 
ARRANGEMENTS TO MAKE ANOTHER TRANSACTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE WITH 
C.I. 01-222 INVOLVING EIGHT "G'S" FOR FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS. 
4. THAT THIS AFFIANT AND AGENT DRAPER FOLLOWED C.I. 01-222 FROM 
THE CAROL KIESER RESIDENCE, AND MET AGAIN AT A SAFE LOCATION TO 
DEBRIEF THE BUY. 
5. THAT THIS AFFIANT RECEIVED A BAGGIE CONTAINING THE PURPORTED 
COCAINE AND A CELLOPHANE WRAPPER THAT CONTAINED A SUBSTANCE ALSO 
PURPORTED TO BE COCAINE FROM C.I. 01-222. THAT THIS AFFIANT RECEIVED 
TWENTY FIVE DOLLARS FROM C.I. 01-222. THATTHISAFFIANT DID AGAIN SEARCH 
THE VEHICLE, AND PERSON OF C.I. 01-222, AND THAT NO MONEY OR 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES WERE FOUND. . 
6. THAT THIS AFFIANT DID DEBRIEF THE BUY WITH C.I. 01-222. THAT C.I. 01-
222 TOLD THIS AFFIANT THAT HE/SHE GAVE KYLE STINGHAM TWO HUNDRED 
TWENTY FIVE DOLLARS. C.I. 01-222 TOLD THIS AFFIANT THAT KYLE STRINGHAM 
GAVE HIM/HER TWO BAGS OF COCAINE. 
7. THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE PURCHASED 
WAS EXAMINED BY THIS AFFIANT AND OTHER EXPERIENCED TASK FORCE 
MEMBERS AND THAT IT DID APPEAR TO BE AN ILLEGAL CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE AS PURPORTED BY KYLE STRINGHAM AND C.I. 01-222. THAT THE 
SUSPECTED COCAINE WAS DELIVERED TO THE UTAH STATE CRIME LAB TO BE 
TESTED. THAT THE SUBSTANCE TESTED POSITIVE FOR COCAINE. 
8. THIS AFFIANT HAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE AND DOES BELIEVE 
THAT KYLE KENT STRINGHAM HAS COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF DISTRIBUTION 
OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE COCAINE IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE 58-37-
8. AND HAS BEEN CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED BY THE INFORMANT. 
THESE OFFENSE OCCURRED WITHIN DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
AFFIANT OFFICER 
THIS AFFIDAVIT WAS SWORN TO BEFORE ME BY AFFIANT ON THIS 
/> DAY O F / ^ f 20 °^ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
